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[L. A. No. 26913. In Bllnk.

Oct. 25, 1962.]

TEITELBAUM FURS, INC. et aI., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v. THE DOMINION INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.,
et a1., Defendants and Appellants.
(1] Judgments-Res Judicata: Action on Different Claim or Cause.
-The doctl'ine of res judicllta has a double aspect. It pre-

[2]

)

[3]

[4]

[6]

cludes parties or their privies from relitigating a cause of
action that has been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, and any issue necessarily decided in such
litigation is conclusively determined as to the parties or their
privies if it is involved in a subsequent lawsuit on a different
cause of action.
ld.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Cause.-In
determining the validity of a plea of res judicata three questions are pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in
question 'I 'Vas there a final jUdgment on the merits' Was
the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in
privity with a party to the prior adjudication'
ld.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim. or Oause-As
Affected by Nature of Proceeding.-The application of collateral estoppel in a civil case to issues determined in a previous criminal action is not precluded.
ld.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Oause-As
Affected by Nature of Proceeding.-A plea of guilty in a
criminal prosecution is admissible in a subsequent civil action
on the independent ground that it is an admission, but it would
not serve the policy underlying collateral estoppel to make
such a plea conclusive.
ld.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Oause.-The
doctrine of collateral estoppel, whereby an issue necessarily
decided in an action in a court of competent jurisdiction is
concl~ively detcrmined as to the parties or their privies if it
is involved in a subsequent lawsuit on a different cause of
action, is based on the public policy of limiting litigation by
preventing a party who has had one fair trial on an issue from

[1J See Oal.Jur.2d, Judgments, §§ 213-215; Am.Jur., Judgments
(rev ed §§ 324, 373).
[3) See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 225; Am.Jur., Judgments (rev
eel § 472 et seq).
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, §§ 338,367; [2, 5] Judgments, § 367; [3,4,6-11] Judgments, § 376.
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again drawing it into controversy. This policy must be considered together with the policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fllir adversary proceeding in which fully to present
his case.
[6] ld.-Res Judicata-Action on· Di1ferent Claim or Cause-As
Mected by Nature of Proceeding.-Considerations of fairness
to civil litigants and regard for the expeditious administration
of criminal justice combine to prohibit the application of
collateral estoppel against a party who, having pleaded guilty
to a criminal charge, seeks for the first time to litigate his
cause in 11 civil action.
(7] leL-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Cause-As
Mected by Na.ture of Proceeding.-To preclude a civil litigant
from relitigating an issue previously found against him in a
criminal prosecution is less severe than to preclude him from
relitigating such an issue in successive civil trials, since there
are rigorous safeguards against unjust conviction, including
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and of a.
unanimous verdict, the right to counsel, and a record pa.id for
by the state on appeal. Stability of judgments and expeditious
trials are served and no injustice done when criminal defendants are estopped from relitigating issues determined in conformity with these safeguards.
[8] ld.-Res Judica~Action on Different Claim or Cause-As
Affected by Nature of Proceeding.-Where a criminal defendant, although not having the initiative in his criminal trial,
was afforded a full opportunity to litigate the issue of his guilt
with all the safeguards afforded the criminal defendant and,
being charged with felonies punishable in the state prison, had
every motive to make as vigorous and effective defense as
possible, any issue necessarily decided in the criminal prosecution is conclusively determined as to the parties if it is involved in a subsequent civil action.
[9] ld.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Cause-As
Mected by Nature of Proceeding.-A criminal judgment that
is subject to collateral attack on the ground, for example, that
it was obtained through the knowing usc of perjured testimony
or suppression of evidence, or that has in effect been set aside
by a pardon based on defendant's innocence, is not res judicata
in a subsequent action.
(10] ld.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Cause-As
Affected by Nature of Proceeding.-A defendant's election not
to testify in his own behalf in a criminal prosecution, presumably made on the assumption that he would benefit thereby,
no more defeats the plea of collateral estoppel in a subsequent
civil action in which /lny issue necessarily determined in the
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criminal case is involved than does failure of a litigant to
introduce relevant available evidence in any other situation.
[11] Id.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Cause-As
Affected by Nature of Proceeding.-Where a criminal defendant's claimed inability to compel the testimony of an nlleged
coconspirator did not warrant a reversal of his conviction,
such claim will not sustain a collateral attack on the criminal
judgment which would render it unavailable as res judicata in
a subsequent civil action involving any issue necessarily determined in the criminal case.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order granting a new trial. A. A.
Scott, Judge. Order reversed with directions.
.
Action to recover under contracts of insurance for losses
allegedly arising out of a robbery. Orders denying defendants'
motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict and granting
their motion for new trial reversed with directions.
Leland, Plattner &; Kalik and Horace L. Kalik for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
Thomas P. Menzies and James O. White, Jr., for Defendants
and Appellants.
TRAYNOR, J.-AUeging losses by robbery, plaintiff corporations brought this action to reco,'cr $244,510.90 under
contracts of insurance with defendant insurers. The jury
returned a verdict for plaintiffs, and the trial court granted
defendants' motion for new trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. The trial court
denied defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. Plaintiffs appeal from the order granting a new trial.
Defendants appeal from the judgment.
We agree with defendants' contention that their plea of
collateral estoppel defeats' plaintiffs' action. In a criminal
action that became final before the present action was commenced. Albert Teitelbaum, president of plaintifl' corporations,
was convicted of conspiracy to commit grand theft, attempted
grand theft, and the filing of a false and fraudulent insurance
claim. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. (People v.
Teitelbaum, 163 Cal.App.2d 184 [329 P.2d 157], petition for
hearing denied Oct. 22, 1958, cert. den., 359 U.S. 206 [79 S.Ct.

I
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738, 3 L.Ed.2d 759).) Plaintiff corporations concede that the
claim in this case is for the same lo!;!; iuvoh'ed ill thc criminal
conviction and that they nre mere alter egos of Teitelbaum.
The issue adjudicated ndvcrsely to plaintiffs in the criminal
action is idehtical with the issue in this action: whether the
allcged robbery occurred as plaintiffs f'ontelld- or whether it
was staged by 'feitelbaum as defendants contend. By its
verdict, the previous jury necessarily found against plaintiffs
on this issue.
[1] The doctrine of res judicata has a double aspect:
(1) it "precludes parties or their privies from relitigating a
cause of action that has been finally determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction." (2)" AllY issue necessarily decided
in such litigation is conclusively determined as to the parties
or their privies if it is involved in a subsequent lawsuit on a
different cause of action." (Bernhard v. Bank 0/ America,
19 Ca1.2d 807, 810 [122 P.2d 892] ; see Taylor v. Hawkinson,
47 Ca1.2d 893, 895-896 [306 P.2d 797].) In the present case,
since plaintiffs' cause of action is different from that of the
state in the criminal proceeding, we are concerned with the
latter aspect, often termed collateral estoppel.
[2] In the Bernhard case, supra, this court rejected the
doctrine of mutuality of estoppel that had been applied to
limit the scope of collateral estoppel, and held three questions
to be pertinent in determining the validity of the plea. "Was
the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the
one presented in the action in question T Was there a final
judgment on the merits T Was the party against whom the
plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the
prior adjudication fIt (19 Ca1.2d at p. 813.) The record in
the present case provides affirmative answers to each of these
questions.
Notwithstanding the apparent applicability of collateral
estoppel, it is contended that the cases in this state do not
indicate that a criminal conviction is conclusive in a subsequent civil action. Additionally, plaintiffs urge that the plea
be rejectei on the ground that since plaintiffs did not have
the initiative in the criminal action and since Teitelbaum chose
not to testify and was una1:l1e to utilize an important witness
in the criminal proceeding, they did not have a full and complete day in court on the issue now sought to be foreclosed
against them.
[3] The cases do not preclude the application of collateral
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estoppel in a civil case to issues determined in a previous
criminal prosecution. Those relied upon for the contrary
proposition are either based upon the doctrine of mutuality of
estoppel (Risd{)n v. Yates, 145 Cal. 210 [78 P. 641] ; Burbank
v. McIntyre, 135 Cal.App. 482 [27 P.2d 400] ; Balestreiri v.
Arques, 49 Cal.App.2d 664 [122 P.2d 277] ; American Fire
etc. Service v. Williams, 171 Cal.App.2d 397 [340 P.2d 644])
or involve a prior acquittal (In re Anderson, 107 Cal.App.2d
670 [237 P.2d 720] ; People v. One 1950 Pont'iac 2-Door Coupe,
193 Cal.App.2d 216[13 Cal.Rptr. 916]) or involve the admissibility as an admission in a civil suit of a plea of guilty in
a previous criminal action (Vaughn v. Jonas, 31 Ca1.2d 586
[191 P.2d 432]).
Since the requirement of mutuality of estoppel was expressly
abandoned in the Bernhard case, Risdon v. Yates, supra, and
the cases following it are no longer authoritative.
In re Anderson, supra, rejected the plea as applied to a
former acquittal on the ground that" 'the difference in degree
in the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes
application of the doctrine of res judicata. The acquittal was
merely . . . an adjudication that the proof was not sufficient
to overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused.'" (107 Cal.App.2d 670, 672; see Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 [58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917];
Annot.18 A.L.R.2d 1287, 1315.)
[ 4] A plea of guilty is admissible in a subsequent civil
action on the independent ground that .it is an admission.
It would not serve the policy underlying collateral estoppel,
however, to make such a plea conclusive. [5] ., The rule
is based upon the sound public policy of limiting litigation
by preventing a party who has had one fair trial on an issue
from again drawing it into controversy." (Bernhard v. Bank
of America, 19 Ca1.2d 807, 811 [122 P.2d 892].) "This policy
must be considered together with the policy that a party shall
not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which fully
to present hili case." (Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 32 Ca1.2d 13,
18 [193 P.2d 728].) When a plea of guilty has been entered
in the prior action, no issues have been "drawn into controversy" by a "full presentation" of the case. It may reflect
only a compromise or a belief that paying a fine is more advantageous than litigation. [6] Considerations of fairness to
civil litigants and regard for the expeditious administration of
criminal justice (see Vaughn v. J011as, 31 Cal.2d 586,594 [191

.-)
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P.2d 432]) combine to prohibit the application of collateral
estoppel against a party who, having pleaded guilty to a criminal charge, seeks for the first time to litigate his cause ina
civil action.
Collateral estoppel applies to successive criminal trials (People v. Beltran, 94 Cal.App.2d 197, 203 [210 P.2d 238] ; People
v. Maja(].o, 22 Cal.App.2d 323, 326 [70 P.2d 1015] ; see People
v. Joseph, 153 Cal.App.2d 548, 551 [314 P.2d 1004] ; Scalfon v.
U1Iited States, 332 U.S. 575, 578 [68 S. Ct. 237, 92 L.Ed. 180] ;
Annot. 147 A.L.R. 991, 992) and, although not widely adopted,
has been applied in the better reasoned cases that have dealt
with the problem here presented. (Eaglc ctc. Ins. Co. v. Heller,
149 Va. 82 [140 S.E. 314, 57 A.L.R. 490] ; Minco v. Eureka
cte. 111s. 00., 182 Pa. Super. 75 [125 A.2d 612] ; A1tstin v.
United States, 125 F.2d 816; see 25 So.Ca1.L.Rev. 480; 40 Cal.
L.Rev. 225; 50 Yale L.J. 499.) Thus it is significant that this
court found support in Eagle etc. IlIs. 00. v. Heller, supra,
in reaching its decision to abandon the requirement of mutuality of estoppel in the Bernhard case. [7] To preclude
a civil litigant from relitigating an issue previously found
against him in a criminal prosecution is less severe than to
preclude him from relitigating such an issue in successive
civil trials, for there are rigorous safeguards against unjust
conviction, including the requirements of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt (Code Civ. Proc., § 2061) and of a unanimous verdict (Pen. Code, § 1164), the right to counsel (In ,·c
James, 38 Cal.2d 302 [240 P.2d 596]), and a record paid for
by the state on appeal (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 33-). Stability of judgments and expeditious trials are served and no
injustice done, when criminal defendants are estopped from
relitigating issues determined in conformity with these safeguards.
[8] Plaintiffs contend, however, that in the absence of
mutuality, collateral estoppel ought not be applied against
a party who did not have the initiative in the previous action.
(See Ne'varov v. Oaldwell, 161 Cal.App.2d 762 [327 P.2d
111] ; Currie, Mutuality of Oollateral Estoppel: Limits of the
Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan.L.Rev. 281, 313.) Although plaintiffs' president did not have the initiative ill his criminal trial,
he was afforded a full opportunity to litigate the issue of his
guilt with all the safeguards afforded the criminal defendant,
and since he was charged with felonies punishable in the state
·Former17 Rules on Appeal, rule 33.

)
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prison (Pen. Code, § 17), he had every motive to make as
vigorous and effective a defense as possible. Under these circumstances, we hold that any issue necessarily decided in a
prior criminal proceeding is conclusively determined as to the
parties if it is involved in a subsequent civil action.
[9] It should be noted, however, that a criminal judgment that is subject to collateral attack on the ground, for
example, that it was obtained through the knowing use of
perjured testimony (Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 [55
S.Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791, 98 A..L.R. 406] ; Alcorta v. Textu,
355 U.S. 28 [78 S.Ct. 103, 2 L. Ed.2d 9]) or suppression of
evidence (People v. Carter, 48 Ca1.2d 737, 747 [312 P.2d 665]),
or that has in effect been set aside by a pardon based on the
defendant's innocence (see Pen. Code, § 4900), is not res
judicata ill a subsequent action. (See Rest., Judgments, § 11.)
Plaintiffs have advanced no grounds that would sustain a
collateral attack on the judgment, but they contend that there
are special reasons why collateral estoppel should not apply
in this case. They point out that Teitelbaum chose not to take
the stand in the criminal prosecution except for the limited
purpose of denying an alleged admission, and contend that
he was unable to secure the testimony of an alleged co-conspirator.
[10] Teitelbaum's election not to testify in his own behalf in the criminal case was presumably made on the assumption that he would benefit thereby. His error, if any, in trial
strategy would no more defeat the plea of collateral estoppel
than the failure of a litigant to introduce relevant available
evidence in any other situation.
[11] Teitelbaum urged his inability to compel the testimony of the alleged co-conspirator on his appeal from the
judgment in the criminal case, and it was determined that it
did not warrant a reversal. A fortiori, it will not sustain a
collateral attack upon the criminal judgment.
The order d~nying defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the order granting a new trial
. are reversed and the trial court,is directed to enter judgment
for defendants. Defendants shall recover their costs on these
appeals.
Gibson, C. J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., and
Tobriner, J., concurred .
. Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment.

